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Reflections on Russia's Revival of Trial by Jury:
History Demands That We Ask Difficult Questions
Regarding Terror Trials, Procedures to Combat
Terrorism, and Our Federal Sentencing Regime
Hon. John C. Coughenour*
"It means, first of all, that we have made a big step in placing the
interests of the individual higher than the interests of the state. 1
Twentieth-century politics irrevocably joined the United States
and Russia as two sides of the same coin; the history and culture of
each became defined, in many respects, in terms of the other. In the
mid-1980s, I attended a first-of-its-kind conference of twenty Ameri-
can jurists and twenty Soviet jurists at Dartmouth College to explore
this duality in the context of our respective judicial systems. 2 For me,
the most memorable portion of the conference was a mock jury trial
conducted for the Soviet visitors. My Cold War perspective and igno-
rance of Russian juridical history led me to expect the Soviet jurists to
react to this program with defensive hostility. I was wrong. Their
hunger for new ideas was palpable; the jury trial proved to be the
highlight of the conference. Less than a decade later, following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, that hunger became the genesis for Rus-
sia's most comprehensive criminal justice reforms since Tsar Alexan-
der II's celebrated 1864 Reforms. These new reforms include the re-
vival of the right to trial by jury for serious criminal offenses.
* Chief United States District Judge, Western District of Washington. Over the past twenty
years, the author has traveled extensively in Russia and the former Soviet Union and participated
in numerous exchange programs sponsored by the American Bar Association's Litigation Sec-
tion, Central and East European Law Initiative, and the U.S. State Department. The author
thanks his law clerk, Cory J. Albright, for assistance with this Article.
1. Dmitri N. Kozak, Deputy Chief of Staff to President Vladimir Putin, commenting on
Russia's reinstitution of jury trials for serious criminal offenses. Steven Lee Myers, Russia
Glances to the West for Its New Legal Code, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2002, at Al.
2. Tom Gonser, former executive director of the American Bar Association, and Weyman
Lundquist, former chair of the American Bar Association Section of Litigation and Soviet Dia-
logue Committee, were instrumental in garnering support for this American Bar Associa-
tion/Association of Soviet Lawyers conference and similar subsequent exchanges.
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Historians have aptly documented both Russia's use of jury trials
during what is known as the Golden Age of Russian Law-the period
from Tsar Alexander II's 1864 Reforms until the October 1917 Revo-
lution-and the subsequent Soviet inquisitorial criminal justice sys-
tem. 3 Likewise, legal scholars have comprehensively analyzed Rus-
sia's 1993 revival of jury trials and its other monumental criminal
justice reforms.4 This Article employs those analyses as a mirror for
reflections on current challenges facing the United States criminal jus-
tice system. Twenty years ago, I believed such challenges, which de-
mand careful scrutiny of the rights of individuals and the interests of
the state, were reserved for my Soviet peers. Times have changed.
Specifically, this Article seeks to stimulate a historically grounded dis-
cussion by asking what Russia's experience with jury trials, the devel-
opment of alternative judicial rules and procedures for political
crimes,5 and jury nullification may teach us about terror trials, proce-
dures to combat terrorism, and our federal sentencing regime. By ask-
ing these questions, Russia's experiences may offer the benefit of both
hindsight and foresight.
This Article begins by discussing the nineteenth-century origins
of trial by jury in Russia and the changes the system endured until the
October 1917 Revolution, focusing particular attention on both the
progressive exclusion of political crimes from the jurisdiction of the
jury and use of alternative judicial procedures for such crimes. Next,
the Article outlines the fundamental -principles of the inquisitorial
criminal justice system, which defined and dominated Soviet jurispru-
dence. Part I concludes by addressing Russia's revival of trial by jury
in 1993, the specific characteristics of its new jury system, the other
monumental criminal justice reforms of the 1990s, and the struggles
that Russia now faces with respect to the implementation of those re-
forms. After developing Russia's juridical history as a historical lens,
Part II uses this lens to focus reflections on terror trials, procedures to
combat terrorism, and the federal sentencing regime in the United
States.
3. I predominantly rely upon the definitive work, SAMUEL KUCHEROV, COURTS,
LAWYERS AND TRIALS UNDER THE LAST THREE TSARS (F.A. Praeger 1953).
4. See, e.g., James W. Diehm, The Introduction of Jury Trials and Adversarial Elements Into
the Former Soviet Union and Other Inquisitorial Countries, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1
(2001); Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 61
(1995) [hereinafter Thaman, The Resurrection].
S. For a thorough historical analysis of military tribunals in the United States in the context
of today's War on Terrorism, see Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree: The Bush Administra-
tion's Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433 (2002).
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I. THE HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY IN RUSSIA
A. The Golden Age of Russian Law
An intellectual wave, premised on the rights of the individual,
swept across Europe and into imperial Russia in the mid-nineteenth
century.6 In 1861, less than ten years into his reign, Tsar Alexander II
emancipated the serfs.7 Next, he tackled the judicial system. The Re-
forms of November 20, 1864 created an independent judiciary and
professional bar, instituted public trials, and granted rights of appeal.'
However, the most radical reform provided the right to trial by jury
with respect to all "crimes or misdemeanors for which the law pre-
scribed punishment involving deprivation of, or restriction in, civil
rights."9 For the first time, a panel of citizens could decide, acording
to their conscience, the guilt or innocence of the individual accused.' °
The 1864 Reforms mandated twelve-person juries with two alternates;
prospective jurors faced no literacy, education, or property require-
ments." As in France, juror unanimity was encouraged, but was not
required. 12 Instead, the jury determined guilt or innocence by simple
majority.' 3 The 1864 Reforms' recognition of individual rights led
them to be labeled "Russia's first constitutional charter."' 4
Nevertheless, the 1864 Reforms faced fierce opposition. Oppo-
nents, including prominent lawyers and intellectuals, objected that the
masses, including emancipated serfs, lacked morality, elementary edu-
cation, or juridical sense.'" They warned that the public's resentment
of law and authority would lead to rampant jury nullification.1 6 In re-
sponse, reformers argued that jury service would educate the public,
6. EDWARD L. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 18, 24
(Methuen Press 1969). Considering Russia's long history of autocracy, the notion of individual
rights was radical. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 53.
7. JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 17.
8. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 104-05; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 18.
9. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 64; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 24. Those without the right
to trial by jury remained tried by courts with class representatives, or people's assessors.
KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 53-54; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 18-19. Courts with class repre-
sentatives included one judge, one member of the nobility class, one member of the bourgeoisie
class, and one member of the peasant class who decided all questions of fact, law, and sentencing.
KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 18-19.
10. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 54.
11. Id. at 58-59.
12. Id. at 61-63.
13. Id. at 61-63. A jury divided six to six resulted in the defendant's acquittal. Id.
14. Id. at 302-07.
15. Id. at 54.
16. Id. at 56.
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teach juridical sense, and foster respect for the law." Further, the re-
formers believed the jury system would inject a degree of popular
compassion into a criminal justice system characterized by frequent
whippings, banishment, and a highly restrictive doctrine of formal
evidence) 8 After thorough debate, the State Council agreed with the
reformers. Interestingly, the Council concluded that a defendant's
peers would better understand the relevant facts, customs, frames of
mind, and morality than the judge, who was usually a member of a
vastly disparate social class than the defendant. 9
Two additional provisions of Russia's jury system demand atten-
tion. First, despite opponents' distrust of the masses, juries had ex-
plicit authority to nullify the law. As in continental Europe, the jury
could acquit the defendant of all crimes charged despite concluding
that the defendant committed the acts alleged, and even when the de-
fendant confessed to committing those acts.2" Thus, the jury's collec-
tive conscience always controlled.2 It is also relevant to note that jury
nullification served as the only means available for public disapproval
of Draconian mandatory sentencing guidelines, which the 1864 Re-
forms did not address.22 In fact, by 1887, approximately half of all ac-
quittals stemmed from the jury's distinction between perpetration and
guilt.23
The second provision of the 1864 Reforms that demands atten-
tion is the exclusion of political crimes from jury consideration.24
That is, any crime that was allegedly motivated by political beliefs,
that was a challenge to government authority, or that threatened the
security of the state was excluded from the jurisdiction of the jury.2"
17. Id. at 54-56.
18. Id. at 54-55. The doctrine of formal evidence is a mechanistic procedure for determin-
ing guilt based on a hierarchy of specific classes of evidence, without recourse to conscience. For
example, if the defendant confesses to the crime, a doctrine of formal evidence might demand
conviction regardless of whether the judge believes the confession was false or involuntary. For a
colorful example of formal rules of evidence, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND
PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 36-38 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979).
19. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 55-56.
20. Id. at 65. The Department of Cassation of the Senate, which operated as the supreme
appellate body, issued a number of interesting opinions regarding jury nullification. See id. at 66.
21. Prior to 1864, the formal rules of evidence precluded this result. Id. at 302-07.
22. Id. at 70. These guidelines prescribed precise penalties for each category of crime and
granted very limited discretion to judges to modify these penalties. Because Russia's executive
and legislative powers remained autocratic, acquittal served as the only democratic means to cor-
rect these sentencing guidelines. For example, despite undisputed evidence that a stolen wallet
contained 500 rubles, a jury might conclude that the wallet contained only 300 rubles, simply
because it determined the 500-ruble penalty was unduly harsh.
23. Id. at 66-67.
24. Id. at 64.
25. JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 24.
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Courts with class representatives tried all such cases, or such cases
were supervised by a special government department.26
The significance of jury nullification and alternative judicial pro-
cedures for political crimes converged in the infamous Vera Zasulich
case. While never criminally convicted, Ms. Zasulich had spent most
of her young adult life imprisoned, banished, or otherwise persecuted
on political grounds.2 ' After learning that the governor of St. Peters-
burg had severely whipped a political prisoner for failing to doff his
cap, Ms. Zasulich became determined to avenge the injustice.28 She
fired a single shot at close range, wounding the governor.29 In 1878,
on undisputed facts, Ms. Zasulich stood trial for attempted murder.
Although the 1864 Reforms did not provide Ms. Zasulich the right to
trial by jury because it was a political crime, the prosecutor chose a
jury trial for political reasons, which included the desire to make a
public example of this revolutionary.3" Ms. Zasulich's defense counsel
devoted considerable argument to his client's past persecution and the
state's repressive treatment of political criminals." The jury, with
substantial public support, acquitted Vera Zasulich.3 2
A tremendous backlash followed. Opponents of the jury sys-
tem-including the relentless conservative press-saw their deepest
fears realized through this expression of resentment toward the state.33
Within months, additional classes of so-called political offenses were
removed from the jurisdiction of the jury.34 Thereafter, no politically
motivated crimes were tried before a jury, but rather were tried before
courts-martial or courts with class representatives.3" The March 1,
1881 assassination of Tsar Alexander II by anti-tsarist domestic ter-
rorists further fueled the backlash against his own democratic judicial
institutions, which sought to elevate the rights of individuals over the
interests of the state. Thereafter, Tsar Alexander II's son, Tsar Alex-
ander III, cemented alternative law enforcement and judicial proce-
dures to combat political unrest in the Law of August 14, 1881, enti-
26. See id. at 24.
27. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 222.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 79-80.
30. Id. at 222; GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 19 (Cam-
bridge University Press 1996).
31. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 218-21.
32. Id. at 222. This case demonstrates the jury system's operation as a political avenue for
citizens to challenge an autocratic regime that stifles and eradicates political dissent. W.E.
BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 23 (Butterworths' Press 1988).
33. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 79.
34. Id. at 80 n.206.
35. JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 19.
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tled "Measures for the Preservation of State Order and Public Tran-
quility. ,36
The Law of August 14, 1881 granted local provincial executives
profound authority, including the following powers: (1) to transfer to
courts-martial the trials of political crimes, the more important of
which to be tried according to war-time laws; (2) to order closed, non-
public criminal trials; (3) to arrest persons on mere suspicion of having
committed a crime against the state, being involved in such a crime, or
belonging to an unlawful association; and (4) to search dwellings with-
out definite suspicion.37 Individuals convicted in such trials faced in-
definite confinement or banishment to remote locales38 Each provin-
cial commander in chief could unilaterally order whole categories of
criminal offenses to be tried by courts-martia3 9 under military law.
41
The government utilized these alternative procedures in part because
military law provided the death penalty for far more offenses than the
standard criminal justice system.41 In short, the Law of August 14,
1881 created a distinct parallel criminal justice system available for
any crime the provincial chief executive unilaterally determined to
have a political character that threatened state security. 42
Although this "extraordinary but temporary measure" was lim-
ited to three years, it was repeatedly extended until the October 1917
Revolution.43 Nevertheless, these reactionary measures, which served
to circumscribe the independence of the judiciary and increase the use
of military courts to try civilians, did little to quell Russia's growing
revolutionary movement.44 A turning point was an 1894 state-
sponsored study that concluded that Russia did not, as opponents to
the jury system relentlessly charged, have an artificially high acquittal
rate. 41 Thereafter, many of the cases previously removed from the ju-
risdiction of the jury returned.46 During this period, the Duma, Rus-
36. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 201-02.
37. Id. at 203. See also id. at 79-80; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 18-19; Duncan DeVille,
Combating Russian Organized Crime: Russia's Fledgling Jury System on Trial, 32 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 73, 76 (1999).
38. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 201-03.
39. Within a span of seven months during 1906 and 1907, over one thousand people were
executed as a result of this process. Id. at 206.
40. Id. at 203. Whether the government charged a defendant pursuant to military law or
the standard criminal code carried important consequences with respect to the defendant's pro-
cedural rights, including the right to counsel. See id. at 232.
41. Id. at 204, 209, 211.
42. Id. at 211-12.
43. Id. at 203.
44. Id. at 202; BUTLER, supra note 32, at 23.
45. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 81.
46. DeVille, supra note 37, at 76-77.
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sia's legislature, sought to introduce trial by jury in all provinces, and
did so by 1914."7 Over time, the fifty-plus years between 1864 and
1917 became known as the Golden Age of Russian Law.4" Despite
imperial rule and a fully autocratic executive and legislative regime,
the judiciary was largely premised on democratic principles during
this time.49
B. The Soviet Inquisitorial Criminal Justice System
Russia's imperial government fell in February 1917. In the
months following the October 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks abol-
ished the professional bar and trial by jury. 0 At that time, Russian
juries had rendered over 7.5 million verdicts."' Ironically, in 1901
Vladimir Lenin, who was later the leading signatory of the decree
abolishing the jury, had defended the democratic and egalitarian na-
ture of Russia's jury system, which he called the "court of the
street." 2 There would be no jury trial in Russia for over seventy-five
years.
The Bolsheviks replaced juries with "people's courts" comprised
of one judge and two to six people's assessors.5 3 Although elected, all
people's assessors were screened by local Communist Party officials
and committees.5 4 In short, the Party controlled the assessors.55 The
judge and assessors heard all evidence, questioned all witnesses, de-
cided all questions of law and fact, and determined guilt or inno-
cence. 6 Despite holding equal voting power, assessors became known
47. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 82.
48. BUTLER, supra note 32, at 23.
49. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 307. The jury system fostered uniform respect for the law
and a sense of equity and justice previously unknown between Russians of disparate social strata.
Id. at 85-86.
50. Id. at 307.
51. DeVille, supra note 37, at 77.
52. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 83.
53. The Statute of October 21, 1920 directed that six people's assessors participate in all
serious criminal offenses. ZIGURDS L. ZILE, IDEAS AND FORCES IN SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY:
A READER ON THE SOVIET STATE AND LAW 98-99 (Oxford University Press 1992). However,
people's courts of one judge and two people's assessors became the norm. Thaman, The Resur-
rection, supra note 4, at 67. As was the case before the Revolution, offenses allegedly against the
security of the state came under the supervision of a special government department. JOHNSON,
supra note 6, at 24.
54. Statute of October 21, 1920 (Russ.); DeVille, supra note 37, at 77; Thaman, The Resur-
rection, supra note 4, at 67.
55. RUDOLF SCHLESINGER, SOVIET LEGAL THEORY: ITS SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND
DEVELOPMENT 65 (Oxford University Press 1945). The Bolsheviks construed the law and
criminal justice system simply as another means to facilitate the economic changes necessary to
create a pure communist state. Diehm, supra note 4, at 22-23.
56. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 67.
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as "nodders" for simply nodding in agreement with the judge.57
Judges, for their part, answered to telephonic instructions from Party
officials.58 Indeed, one Soviet judge told me that he always stood at
attention when answering such calls from Party officials. The whole
system became known sarcastically as "telephone justice."5 9 People's
assessors virtually always agreed with judges; acquittals were virtually
nonexistent.6"
These procedures reflect the fact that the Soviet criminal justice
system was fundamentally grounded in the inquisitorial tradition.61 In
the inquisitorial system, the judge is a "truth-seeker" who directs the
criminal investigation and judicial inquiry, including introducing evi-
dence and questioning witnesses.62 Under the Soviet system, the judge
could initiate new criminal charges at trial, proceed with the prosecu-
tion if the prosecutor failed to appear, or proceed despite the prosecu-
tor's motion to dismiss.63 Moreover, if the judge determined at trial
that insufficient evidence existed to convict the defendant, the judge
would usually return the case for "supplemental investigation," thus
providing the prosecutor multiple bites at the apple.64 In sum, unlike
our adversarial system, the Soviet inquisitorial criminal justice system
neither prioritized nor emphasized the rights of individual defendants,
but instead paid homage to the interests of the state.65
57. DeVille, supra note 37, at 77; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 67. A peo-
ple's assessor reported to the same courtroom everyday during his or her term of service, which
lasted several months or longer. Deville, supra note 37, at 82. As a result, the assessors became
dedicated to their respective judge in the same way grand juries are said to become dedicated to a
prosecutor with whom they regularly work. Id. In the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet legal scholars
advocated reforming the system to have an expanded number of people's assessors given exclu-
sive responsibility for deciding guilt. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 68. This they
considered tantamount to trial by jury. Id.
58. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 68; Diehm, supra note 4, at 23-25.
59. Diehm, supra note 4, at 23-25.
60. Id.; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 81.
61. The inquisitorial system shares roots with the practice of religious clerics conducting
inquiries into wrongdoing. See Diehm, supra note 4, at 6-7.
62. Id. The inquisitorial system makes no use of case law precedent. Rather, each case is
evaluated independently with reference to the relevant legislative code or materials. Id. at 9.
63. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 99; Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury
Systems: The Cases of Spain and Russia, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 243 (1999) [herein-
after Thaman, New Jury Systems]. Even today, prosecutors only appear for approximately four
out of every ten bench trials. DeVille, supra note 37, at 106.
64. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 101.
65. Critics of the adversarial system object to the abandonment of a truth-seeking inquiry
in favor of a persuasion contest between skilled lawyers. See, e.g., Fyodor Dostoyevsky, THE
DIARY OF A WRITER (C. Scribner's Sons 1949) (1877).
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C. Russia's Revival of Trial by Jury
In October 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation
approved Boris Yeltsin's proposed blueprint for judicial reform.66
This blueprint led to the passage of the Jury Law of July 16, 1993, as
well as the first jury trial in seventy-five years, held on December 15,
1993.67 The criminal code now provides defendants the right to trial
by jury for serious criminal offenses, such as cases where the possible
punishment is at least ten years imprisonment or death.6' These of-
fenses are distilled into approximately thirty-five serious felonies.69
However, the initial Jury Law called for jury trials in only nine of
Russia's eighty-nine regions.7" Thus, in eighty regions, courts with
people's assessors retained jurisdiction over all criminal offenses.71
Then, in December 2001, President Vladimir Putin signed
monumental criminal justice legislation, including approximately
3,500 reforms to the criminal code. 2  This legislation mandated jury
trials in all eighty-nine regions for serious criminal offenses beginning
on January 1, 2003.7 Overcoming staunch resistance, the legislation
66. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 70. Although former-President Mikhail
Gorbachev proposed the revival of jury trials in May 1989 as part of perestroika, the attempted
coup of 1991 halted implementation of any such legislation. DeVille, supra note 37, at 78.
67. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 62-63.
68. DeVille, supra note 37, at 78-79; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 85. The
initial blueprint proposed jury trials for all crimes punishable by one year imprisonment or more.
Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 85. A defendant may waive the right to trial by jury
and proceed before a people's court of one judge and two people's assessors. Thaman, New Jury
Systems, supra note 63, at 238; The Honorable Steven R. Plotkin, The Jury Trial in Russia, 2
TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1, 2-3 (1994). People's courts retain jurisdiction over the vast major-
ity of criminal offenses. Id.
69. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 80. Such cases arise only in Russia's re-
gional, or oblast, courts-second-level courts of original jurisdiction-not in people's courts of
general jurisdiction. Id; Vasily A. Vlasihin, Introduction to the Legal System of Russia, A.B.A.
CENTRAL AND EAST EUR. L. INITIATIVE 2 (Jan. 1996).
70. Vlasihin, supra note 69, at 3. The Jury Law mandated jury trials in only nine regions
because, for political reasons, the reintroduction of jury trials was labeled an "experiment." See
Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 78-81. Staunch opponents including politicians,
prosecutors or procurators, and judges-vigorously defeated any proposal mandating jury trials
nationwide or in the local courts of general jurisdiction. See id. The nine regions were chosen
based on their moderate size, economic stability, and diversity, as well as the absence of political
or nationalist tensions. See id. at 81.
71. In people's district courts-the local courts of general jurisdiction-cases are tried by
one of the following three methods: (1) a professional judge and two people's assessors, (2) three
professional judges, or (3) a single professional judge. Vlasihin, supra note 69, at 2-3.
72. Myers, supra note 1.
73. Id. However, in December 2002, citing financial and technical impossibilities, the Rus-
sian Duma (the lower house of parliament) approved amendments postponing the January 1,
2003 deadline for the introduction of jury trials. Duma Puts Jury Trials on Hold, IPR
STRATEGIC Bus. INFO. DATABASE, Dec. 22, 2002. The amendments call for gradual introduc-
tion of jury trials over the next four years: approximately twelve regions will begin jury trials in
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will transfer the right to issue arrest and search warrants from prosecu-
tors to judges on January 1, 2004.7 The prior Jury Law of July 16,
1993 and these subsequent December 2001 criminal justice reforms
implement principles articulated in Russia's 1993 Constitution.
These principles include the right to trial by jury, the right to counsel,
the presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination,
an adversarial procedure, and the exclusion of illegally gathered evi-
dence. 6 In conjunction with these Miranda-type protections, courts
have begun applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to ex-
clude confessions and other evidence gathered in violation of these
constitutional rights.77 Finally, the reforms require an initial court ap-
pearance within forty-eight hours and significantly reduce pretrial de-
tention. 78
Russia's revived jury system shares many similarities with the
jury system instituted by Tsar Alexander II's 1864 Reforms. For ex-
ample, a jury is comprised of twelve jurors, with two alternates who
observe the trial.7 9 In addition, although a jury must strive for una-
nimity, a simple majority controls if the jury fails to reach unanimity
after deliberating three hours.8" Moreover, as it did over a century
earlier, Russia's revived jury system allows for explicit jury nullifica-
tion." Reformers considered nullification a necessary democratic
January 2003; approximately twelve regions will begin in July 2003; all other regions will begin
jury trials by January 1, 2004, except Chechnya, which is delayed until 2007. Id.
74. Myers, supra note 1. However, critics note that prosecutors retain the authority to issue
warrants "in exceptional circumstances when the case won't allow for delay." Dmitry Pinsker,
Case for True Legal Reform Looks Far from Watertight, RUS. J., July 13-19, 2001.
75. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 98. For example, the Constitution guaran-
tees the right to trial by jury in cases stipulated by federal law. Thus, this "guarantee" required
implementing legislation.
76. Myers, supra note 1; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 98.
77. Thaman, New Jury Systems, supra note 63, at 241-42.
78. Myers, supra note 1; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 73. Previously, pre-
trial detainees would remain incarcerated for up to eighteen months. Id.
79. Plotkin, supra note 68, at 10. Because of administrative difficulties generating juror
lists, for 2003 most jurors may be former people's assessors. Judicial Reform Faces Serious Obsta-
cles in the Regions, 7 EASTWEST INST. RUSSIAN REG'L REP., No. 8 (Feb. 27, 2002) (hereinafter
Judicial Reform]. Jurors are required to serve no more than once a year, for no longer than ten
days or until the end of trial. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 83; Plotkin, supra note
68, at 7. The reforms provided great financial incentive for jury service. Jurors are paid the
equivalent of their current salary, prorated for the time served, or one-half the prorated salary of
the judge, whichever is higher. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 83; Plotkin, supra
note 68, at 6. Nevertheless, as a result of problems compiling juror lists and insufficient funding
to regularly compensate jurors as required in a timely fashion, the appearance rate for summon-
sed jurors has been as low as 35%. DeVille, supra note 37, at 99-100.
80. Plotkin, supra note 68, at 16-17. As before, a six to six vote results in acquittal. Id.
81. However, Russia's revived jury system does not categorically remove politically moti-
vated crimes from the province of the jury.
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measure to correct unpopular laws and state oppression.8 2 This drama
plays out in three specific questions on every special verdict form:83 (1)
whether the prosecution proved the corpus delicti; (2) whether the
prosecution proved defendant's identity as the perpetrator; and (3)
whether the defendant is guilty of committing a crime.84 If six jurors
vote "no" on any of these three questions, the defendant is acquitted.
Thus, even if the jury concludes that the defendant committed the
acts charged, it may acquit. A fourth question, which asks whether
the defendant deserves leniency or special leniency, provides the jury
with yet another corrective measure.8" Following closing arguments,
the judge summarizes the range of penalties for each crime charged so
that the jury may deliberate with a complete understanding of the
ramifications of its decisions.8 6 In reaching its verdict, the jury is not
constrained by formal rules of evidence; it may freely evaluate the per-
suasiveness of all evidence.87
Once again, jury-system opponents-predominantly prosecutors
and political and judicial conservatives-argued that the public's lin-
gering resentment of government authority would result in a high ac-
quittal rate.88 Once again, statistics suggest that this high acquittal
rate is mythical. Between 1994 and 1997, juries acquitted approxi-
mately fourteen to twenty-two percent of criminal defendants.8 9 In-
82. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 114. Considering Russia's long history of
autocratic rule, this sentiment is not surprising.
83. This form includes myriad factual questions relevant to affirmative defenses, degree of
culpability, and lesser included offenses. Plotkin, supra note 68, at 15. As in our system, ques-
tions of law are not submitted to the jury; the jury receives only pure questions of fact. Thaman,
New jury Systems, supra note 63, at 250. However, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation
has removed questions of mens rea from the jury, holding that mens rea is not a pure question of
fact. Id. at 253. This conclusion has seriously circumscribed the role and power of the jury be-
cause mens rea is so essential in murder cases (and other cases serious enough to get the jury). Id.
at 257.
84. Thaman, New Jury Systems, supra note 63, at 250.
85. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 102.
86. Id. at 124.
87. Thaman, New Jury Systems, supra note 63, at 233. The ability to freely evaluate all of
the evidence includes a defendant's guilty plea. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 103.
In Russia, plea bargaining does not exist and all cases go to trial. Therefore, even if a defendant
pleads guilty at the outset of trial before the jury and the judge employs an abbreviated trial pro-
cedure as a result, the jury must nevertheless deliberate and reach a verdict. Thaman, New Jury
Systems, supra note 63, at 245-46. Thus, the jury's power of nullification still exists, despite a
plea of guilty.
88. DeVille, supra note 37, at 97-99; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 78-81
(discussing jury opponents).
89. DeVille, supra note 37, at 99. This number is comparable to the 15-20% acquittal rate
in the two decades following the 1864 Reforms. Thaman, New Jury Systems, supra note 63, at
257. In sharp contrast, in cases tried without a jury, the conviction rate hovers steady at ap-
proximately 99%. Id. It is important to note that Russia has no plea-bargaining system; all cases
proceed to trial.
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terestingly, juries in the United States, which lack any explicit ability
to nullify, acquit felony defendants at a rate of approximately sixteen
percent in federal court and twenty percent in state court.90 Despite
this reasonable acquittal rate, the Supreme Court of the Russian Fed-
eration has overturned acquittals with alarming frequency: the rate of
overturned acquittals has increased steadily from seventeen percent in
1995 to forty-eight percent in 1997.91 Moreover, the Court may re-
verse on any grounds, including the exclusion of evidence, the admit-
tance of character evidence, and issues not briefed by the parties. 92
This trend indicates a reluctance both to truly embrace democratic ju-
dicial reform and to prioritize the rights of individuals over the inter-
ests of the state.
Accordingly, despite these sweeping reforms the jury trial re-
mains "a peculiar appurtenance on an otherwise inquisitorial criminal
process."93 For example, despite the presumption of innocence, the
defendant spends the entire trial in the courtroom caged behind bars,94
and the judge largely retains an inquisitorial role. At a preliminary
hearing, the judge determines if sufficient evidence exists to proceed to
trial; if not, the judge generally returns the case to the prosecutor for
further investigation, without any double-jeopardy implications. At
trial, the judge actively questions witnesses and may seek to elicit es-
sential factual evidence-already revealed to the judge at the prelimi-
nary hearing-that the prosecutor neglected to elicit.96 Moreover, be-
cause the judge must review all of the evidence and the parties'
respective positions before dismissing the jury for deliberations, the
risk of expressing opinion or identifying testimonial inconsistencies is
high.97 Finally, despite the guarantee of an adversarial procedure and
the presumption of innocence, the victim of the alleged crime enjoys
90. DeVille, supra note 37, at 99.
91. Thaman, New Jury Systems, supra note 63, at 258; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra
note 4, at 129.
92. Thaman, New jury Systems, supra note 63, at 247-58.
93. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 138; Diehm, supra note 4, at 4. Many
judges are holdovers from the Soviet system who spent their entire careers protecting state power
and state interests in preference to individual rights. Diehm, supra note 4, at 17-21. In addition,
because these judges have historically been equally responsible for determining questions of both
law and fact, they may have difficulty properly crafting interrogatories for the jury on the special
verdict form that distinguish these questions, particularly in the context of elements of the crime,
burdens of proof, and affirmative defenses. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 118-23.
94. DeVille, supra note 37, at 73.
95. Thaman, New Jury Systems, supra note 63, at 241.
96. Id. at 246.
97. Plotkin, supra note 68, at 15.
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procedural rights equal or superior to those of the prosecutor and de-
fense.9"
Nevertheless, Russia's Jury Law and other recent criminal justice
reforms are its most important steps toward an independent judiciary
and the protection of individual rights since the 1864 Reforms. Presi-
dent Putin celebrates the reforms as creating a "dictatorship of law."99
No longer shall the judiciary merely function to execute the policies of
the dominant political party. 100 Yet critics complain that the reforms
fail to correct fundamental flaws in the inquisitorial system, such as
judges' ability to overturn jury verdicts acquitting criminal defendants
and the lack of any truly adversarial process.10' Likewise, President
Putin concedes that a "big gap" remains between paper and practice
with respect to individual rights articulated by the 1993 Constitution,
the Jury Law, and the recent reforms.0 2 The hurdles of politics and
history are further exacerbated by inadequate funding.'0 3 Despite
guaranteeing the right to counsel and trial by jury, the reforms failed
to earmark funds for public defenders, who receive less compensationthan jurors for their service.1' Similarly, the judiciary's lamentable
physical infrastructure will have difficulty accommodating twelve-
person juries. 10 5
II. HISTORICALLY GROUNDED REFLECTIONS ON TERROR
TRIALS, PROCEDURES TO COMBAT TERRORISM, AND OUR
FEDERAL SENTENCING REGIME
The constitutional and judicial heritage of the United States is
remarkably strong. This heritage guarantees the right to trial by jury
in all criminal cases and offers other important legal protections that
elevate the rights of individuals over the interests of the state. In con-
trast, today Russia struggles against its deeply embedded autocratic
98. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 101. For example, the victim may be repre-
sented by counsel, participate in the preliminary hearing, veto the prosecutor's motion to dis-
miss, veto the prosecutor's motion to return for supplemental investigation, question all wit-
nesses, and make closing arguments. Id. at 101-12; Thaman, New Jury Systems, supra note 63, at
243; Plotkin, supra note 68, at 14-15.
99. Myers, supra note 1.
100. Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 63.
101. The Devil Ended Up in the Details, Moscow TIMES, Nov. 27, 2001, at 12.
102. Myers, supra note 1.
103. For example, President Putin pledged $1.5 million to support the reform, which pro-
vided for the hiring of more judges. Myers, supra note 1. However, whether such funding will
actually occur is unclear. See, e.g., Judicial Reform, supra note 79 (the 2002 Russian federal
budget earmarks only 111 million rubles-approximately $3.5 million for judicial reforms).
104. Myers, supra note 1; Thaman, The Resurrection, supra note 4, at 87.
105. Guy Chazan, Russia Considers Overhaul of Judiciary, WALL ST. J. EUR., Nov. 20,
2001, at 2.
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and inquisitorial traditions in order to implement such institutions.
Nevertheless, this general contrast is neither absolute nor grounds for
historical myopia. For example, juxtapose Tsar Alexander II's 1861
emancipation of Russian serfs with President Lincoln's 1863 emanci-
pation of American slaves. Despite our revered constitutional heri-
tage, we denied the most fundamental liberties to four million indi-
viduals for a century. Moreover, freed serfs sat as jurors alongside
their former masters generations before African-American freemen
did the same. Put simply, the United States has no monopoly on pro-
gressive legal reform, and we must examine the strength of our institu-
tions at every opportunity.
Russia's revival of trial by jury and implementation of criminal
justice institutions that elevate the rights of individuals over the inter-
ests of the state has triggered renewed interest in its juridical history.
Russia's experiences offer both an important opportunity and a unique
historical perspective to reflect on the challenges confronting our own
criminal justice system. In the United States, today's terror trials and
efforts to combat terrorism reveal state strategies to confront threats to
the state. Critics protest that these strategies sacrifice the rights of in-
dividuals. Regardless of one's viewpoint, a principal strategy has been
the use of alternative law enforcement and judicial procedures' 6-
with respect to surveillance, 10 7 access to counsel,0'0  detention, 0 9 and
secrecy"--for a category of criminal activity threatening national se-
curity, generally defined as terrorism. Russia's juridical history, par-
ticularly its development of alternative law enforcement and judicial
procedures for political crimes," demands that we ask difficult ques-
106. I intend this phrase to include quasi-judicial procedures employed with respect to the
detention of enemy combatants, who are removed from the standard criminal justice system.
107. See infra notes 145-153 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text. The Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service's arrest, detention, and deportation of Muslim men following the September 11,
2001 attacks, via nonpublic proceedings, is well beyond the scope of this Article. However, for a
noteworthy example of challenges to and rulings on such practices, see Ali v. Ashcroft, No. 02-
2304, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2042 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2003) (order enjoining INS from cate-
gorically deporting Somali nationals on vague basis of identifying population as political or ter-
rorist threat).
110. See, e.g., Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). Fol-
lowing the Seventh Circuit's decision in O'Neill, plaintiffs' counsel complained, "IT]he key issue
in the case is the question of whether we supported terrorism and [whether] the government can
rely upon secret evidence to make its case. How do you go about proving your innocence when
the government can rely on secret evidence that you can't even see?" Josh Meyer, Court Upholds
Terrorism Law Secrecy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at Al.
111. At the outset, I note that the threat to the state perceived by late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth century Russia was domestic revolt, which was aimed at overthrowing the Tsar. In
contrast, the threat posed to the United States today is from predominantly foreign sources. De-
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tions regarding the employment of such procedures and the conse-
quences of doing so. Further, Russia's past and present jury systems
merit renewed discussion of jury nullification in the context of our
federal sentencing regime.
A. The Need to Diligently Monitor the Use of Alternative Law
Enforcement and Judicial Procedures in the War on Terrorism
On January 1, 2003, Russia inaugurated the celebrated jewel of
its 3,500 criminal justice reforms: the nationwide right to trial by jury
for serious criminal offenses.112 Our criminal justice system had been
the leading model for these reforms."' Ironically, on that New Year's
Eve, Washington, D.C.'s leading newspaper offered the following
cautionary words about our own system:
The broad danger, in our view, is that a kind of alternative legal
system has come into existence for an ill-defined category of of-
fenses involving national security. For suspected terrorists, the
government has its choice of the surveillance regularly used for
criminal suspects or the less-regulated regime designed for for-
eign intelligence. It can try suspects in courts or in military tri-
bunals or-if it chooses to designate them as enemy fighters-
not try them at all. It can give them lawyers or deny them law-
yers and can, if it chooses, monitor lawyer-client communica-
tions. While the government makes a case for each of these au-
thorities (for some more convincingly than for others), the
environment they create cumulatively is troubling. This is par-
ticularly true because the war they are intended for may prove a
near-permanent state of affairs, and victory may be difficult to
recognize. It is an environment in which the president has
nearly unbridled authority to pick the legal regime most advan-
tageous at every step of an investigation or a proceeding against
an individual-in which a person can be plucked out of the pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights at the whim of the executive branch
of government .... The administration too often acts as though
there is no useful discussion to be had .... 114
I seek to contribute to this discussion by articulating an analytical
framework contextualized by Russian history. Through the lens of
Russian history, this "ill-defined category of offenses involving na-
spite this fundamental distinction, history has applied the label of terrorism to both of these
threats, and I believe Russia's historical experience is worthy of reflection.
112. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text. As discussed above, financial and
technical problems have delayed the implementation of jury trials in some regions.
113. Myers, supra note 1.
114. The Stakesfor Liberty, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2002, at A16.
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tional security" is reminiscent of the notion of political crimes and the
Law of August 14, 1881."'
1. Articulating and Illustrating an Analytical Framework
Conceptualize a continuum of crime. At one end of the contin-
uum fall crimes with no evident political motivation." 6 At the oppo-
site end of the spectrum lie crimes driven by intense political beliefs,
including the heinous acts of conspiracy and murder committed on
September 11, 2001. Such political crimes have come to be labeled
acts of war " 7 due to their explicit challenge of and perceived threat to
the state, regardless of explicit state sponsorship.118
Now conceptualize a second continuum superimposed on the
first. This second continuum represents law enforcement and judicial
procedures for investigating, adjudicating, and punishing crime. All
of these procedures vary depending on the political nature of the
crime. Article III courts, trial by jury, and the constitutional protec-
tions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments lie at one end of the
continuum. At the opposite end of the continuum are military tribu-
nals-entirely outside of the traditional criminal justice system-
historically employed by the executive branch in rare circumstances.1 19
Together, these continua embody a balance between the rights of the
individual and the interests of the state.
As specific criminal cases arise in our struggle against terrorism
and breathe life into the various law enforcement and judicial proce-
dures falling along these continua, we must ask difficult questions re-
garding how this process occurs. The place where a case falls along
the continua may profoundly affect the law enforcement and judicial
procedures employed and thus the balance of the rights of the individ-
ual and the interests of the state in that case. Therefore, we must first
recognize the profound significance of where a case is placed along
115. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
116. However, to the extent that every crime offends a rule enforced by state power, that
crime is political. See FOUCAULT, supra note 18, at 90 (analogizing a state's reaction to crime
through a display of power to the state's reaction to first signs of rebellion or civil war).
117. Similarly, in Russia, the Law of August 14, 1881 provided that "more important" po-
litical crimes should be tried before courts-martial according to war-time laws. See supra notes
36-49 and accompanying text.
118. In our system of government, the invocation of war carries profound constitutional
and statutory implications with respect to executive power and discretion.
119. See Belknap, supra note 5, at 433. For example, German saboteurs who were put
ashore from submarines off of Long Island in World War II were determined to be unlawful
combatants who were not protected by the rules of war, and were instead subject to trial before
military tribunals. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). It is important to note that trials before
military tribunals are not actually criminal trials, and constitutional protections do not apply.
See, e.g., Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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these continua, and the effect such placement has on judicial rights,
rules, and procedures. Then, we must ask the following questions:
Who defines a crime?; What is the extent of that authority?; and, To
what extent can alternative procedures be invoked? Finally, we must
be wary of whether, over time, law enforcement and judicial proce-
dures traditionally reserved for one end of these continua will begin to
bleed outward, permeating other procedures and shifting the fulcrum
that preserves our constitutional balance.
Several current cases help frame these issues. When judicial
rules, rights, and procedures vary based on a crime's political nature,
the mere definition of that crime becomes vital. For example, in late
2002, Virginia prosecutors charged 17-year-old John Lee Malvo-who
allegedly shot and killed thirteen victims in the Washington, D.C.
area-under a new anti-terrorism provision of Virginia's death penalty
statute that was enacted after the September 11, 2001 attacks. 121
Prosecutors invoked this provision because they believe it authorizes
the death penalty without proof that Malvo pulled the trigger, in con-
trast to the other death penalty provision under which he was
charged.12' Despite the apparent absence of any political motivation
for the killings, prosecutors argue that Malvo's alleged demand for $10
million after nine of the killings satisfies the statutory definition of ter-
rorism.122 Therefore, the state's interest in the outcome of the prose-
cution plays an essential role in the definition of the crime. 123 How-
ever, the Malvo case exemplifies only the most subtle gradation along
the continua outlined above.
The case of Jos& Padilla more starkly illustrates the significance
of defining one's criminal status along these continua. Padilla, a
120. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(13) (Michie 2002) ("The willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing of any person by another in the commission of or attempted commission of an
act of terrorism as defined in § 18.2-46.4."); Maria Clod & Josh White, Malvo Case Prosecutors
Begin Bid for Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2003, at Al. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4
defines an act of terrorism as "an act of violence ... committed with the intent to (i) intimidate
the civilian population at large; or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of the government of the
United States, a state or locality through intimidation."
121. See Burlile v. Virginia, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365-66 (Va. 2001) (under multiple-slayings
provision, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(8), defendant must be triggerman in principal murder
charged); Glod & White, supra note 120.
122. Josh White, Bank Visit May Help Case Against Malvo, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2003, at
Al. In contrast, less than four months after September 11, 2001, a fifteen -year- old boy who ex-
pressed sympathy for the September 11 attackers and Osama bin Laden deliberately flew a small
aircraft into a Tampa skyscraper, killing only himself. Small, Stolen Plane Slams into Tampa
Skyscraper, available at http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/01/05/tampa.crash/index.html (last
visited March 22, 2003). After the crash, White House Deputy Press Secretary Scott McClellan
immediately stated, "[T]here is no indication of terrorism." Id.
123. Of course, this process occurs in all criminal prosecutions, particularly under our fed-
eral sentencing regime, discussed infra.
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United States citizen, was detained in May 2002 upon arrival in Chi-
cago from Pakistan for his alleged role in a conspiracy to detonate a
bomb laced with radioactive material.124 On June 9, 2002, President
Bush designated Padilla an "enemy combatant," and the Department
of Defense assumed his custody. 125 Because no criminal charges were
filed, Padilla's constitutional right to counsel and his right against self-
incrimination did not attach.'26 Padilla challenged his detention and
lack of access to counsel by means of a habeas corpus petition.127 On
December 4, 2002, the Honorable Michael B. Mukasey held that the
military' could detain Padilla for the duration of the war on terrorism
if the President presented "some evidence" that Padilla "engaged in a
mission against the United States on behalf of an enemy with whom
the United States is at war, and ... that evidence has not been entirely
mooted by subsequent events."' 29 In this case and in others, the gov-
ernment has taken the position that no enemy combatant detainee, re-
gardless of citizenship, has either the right to counsel or the right to
challenge their detention. 30 As the number of cases grow with the du-
ration of the war on terrorism, we must scrutinize the reasoning be-
hind these decisions, as well as their consequences.
The Zacarias Moussaoui trial provides an important opportunity
to ask additional questions regarding the definition of crimes along the
continua and the ability to invoke procedures in the alternative.
Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth hijacker, was charged under the fed-
eral criminal code in United States District Court. 131 On January 31,
2003, the Honorable Leonie M. Brinkema ordered the government to
provide Moussaoui's defense counsel access to Ramzi Binalshibh, the
124. Stevenson Swanson, A Question of Rights for Enemy Combatants: Are Such Citizens En-
titled to Constitutional Protections?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 10, 2003, at A2.
125. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 569. The phrases "enemy combatant" and "unlawful
combatant" are used interchangeably throughout this order. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Interestingly, it is unclear whether Padilla could be tried by a military tribunal. See
Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 2001 WL 143562 (Nov. 16, 2001).
129. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 608. However, Judge Mukasey exercised his discretion in
the habeas corpus context and ordered that Padilla have access to counsel. Id. It appears the
government may appeal that request. See Swanson, supra note 124.
130. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 282-83 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding these rights
not available to person who was born in the United States yet was captured in late 2001 by U.S.
forces in Afghanistan).
131. Moussaoui, an admitted member of Al Qaeda, denies any involvement in the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 attacks. At the time of his arrest, he was training at a Minnesota flight school.
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self- proclaimed coordinator of the September 11, 2001 attacks. 132 Pur-
suant to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 133 the
government immediately appealed the order and moved to stay all dis-
trict court proceedings. 134  The district court granted the stay in part,
and vacated the trial date to allow the appeal to be heard.'
Administration officials suggest that if the Fourth Circuit de-
clines to reverse Judge Brinkema's order, or if it does reverse and
Judge Brinkema concludes that Moussaoui's ability to mount a de-
fense is unconstitutionally compromised, the President may unilater-
ally designate Moussaoui an enemy combatant and remove his prose-
cution from federal court to a military tribunal.'36 This virtually
unreviewable designation, as discussed above, would strip Moussaoui
of the constitutional rights and procedures that he has enjoyed for over
a year with respect to the same acts. 37  In addition, the government
has not articulated how Moussaoui, who was arrested in Minnesota in
August 2001-prior to the declaration of the war on terrorism-
satisfies the definition of enemy combatant. Moreover, reports sug-
gest that the military has yet to define the elements of the crimes that
would be charged. 3 Although these remain only questions, Russian
history suggests that we must consider them carefully in order to en-
sure that the interests of the state do not swallow the rights of indi-
viduals, even those individuals who directly challenge the state.
Finally, the hastily enacted Patriot Act,'39 which dramatically ex-
tended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), demonstrates
132. Susan Schmidt & Dana Priest, Judge Orders Access to Detainee for Moussaoui's Lawyers,
WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2003, at A9. Binalshibh was captured in Pakistan in 2002. Because Judge
Brinkema's order is sealed, the precise nature of the access ordered is unknown.
133. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2002). Pursuant to the Act, the right of interlocutory appeal
exists for any orders "authorizing the disclosure of classified information, imposing sanctions for
nondisclosure of classified information, or refusing a protective order sought by the United States
to prevent the disclosure of classified information." Id. § 7(a). Classified information means
"any information or material that has been determined by the United States Government pursu-
ant to an Executive order, statute, or regulation, to require protection against unauthorized dis-
closure for reasons of national security .... " Id. § 1(a). Because Judge Brinkema's order is
sealed, it is unknown what the government has identified as classified information or whether the
government has identified Binalshibh himself as classified information. Likewise, it is unknown
what level of access Judge Brinkema ordered.
134. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2017, *1 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 7, 2003).
135. Id. at **2 -3.
136. Philip Shenon, Moussaoui Case May Have to Shift from U.S. Court to Tribunal, Ad-
ministration Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at A13.
137. See supra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
138. Susan Schmidt, Prosecution of Moussaoui Nears a Crossroad, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
2003, at A8.
139. Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act on October 26, 2001. USA Patriot Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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the need to closely monitor whether alternative law enforcement pro-
cedures and alternative judicial procedures located on one end of the
continua, which seek to repel threats to the state, are gradually envel-
oping procedures prioritizing the rights of individuals. 4 ' FISA, en-
acted by Congress in 1978, created a single seven-judge court that re-
views ex parte government applications for electronic surveillance
(predominantly wiretaps) and search warrant applications to obtain
foreign intelligence information."' FISA reduces probable cause stan-
dards, authorizes highly intrusive intelligence gathering techniques,
and gives this authorization for extended periods of time.'42 Due to
concerns about the constitutionality of these provisions, the FISA
court historically ensured that intelligence activities were not directed
toward domestic criminal prosecutions.' 43 In sharp contrast, the Pa-
triot Act now provides that the government may employ FISA proce-
dures primarily for domestic law enforcement purposes. 144
In March 2002, United States Attorney General John Ashcroft
submitted for the FISA court's approval new procedures to facilitate
the "acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information involving
the FISA between FBI counterintelligence and counterterrorism offi-
140. Russia is also presently confronted with this debate. There, although prosecutors ve-
hemently opposed surrendering their right to issue search and arrest warrants, that surrender will
occur January 1, 2004. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Yet, because prosecutors suc-
cessfully retained authority to issue search and arrest warrants in "emergency cases," the judici-
ary has a duty to closely monitor the use of that authority.
141. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1822 (2002). Foreign intelligence information means:
(1) information that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary
to, the ability of the United States to protect against (A) actual or potential attack or
other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; (B) sabotage
or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; or (C)
clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power or by an agent of a foreign power; or (2) information with respect to a foreign
power or foreign territory that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is
necessary to (A) the national defense or the security of the United States; or (B) the
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.
Id. § 1801(e).
For a detailed discussion of FISA and the impact of the Patriot Act, see Alison A. Bradley,
Comment, Extremism in the Defense Of Liberty?: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the
Significance of the USA Patriot Act, 77 TUL. L. REV. 465 (2002).
142. In Re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002), corrected and amended by In Re Sealed Case, 310
F.3d 717 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
143. See In Re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d at 611.
144. See 50 U.S.C. § 1823(a)(7)(B) (2002) (foreign intelligence need only be a "significant
purpose" of the surveillance). Reports suggest that the Justice Department has been drafting a
"Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003" that would further expand FISA to the realm of
"domestic terrorism." For more information, and for a link to the full text of the draft, visit
http://www.publicintegrity.org.
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cials on the one hand, and FBI criminal investigators, trial attorneys in
the Justice Department's Criminal Division, and U.S. Attorney's Of-
fices on the other hand."' In reviewing these procedures, the court
discussed a pattern and practice of government abuse of FISA, includ-
ing the submission of materially false statements and omissions. 4 6
Furthermore, the executive branch has repeatedly violated the court's
orders regarding "unauthorized disseminations to criminal investiga-
tors and prosecutors." '47 Due in part to this past abuse, the court
unanimously rejected the Attorney General's proposed procedures,
which intended that criminal prosecutors "have a significant role di-
recting FISA surveillances and searches from start to finish in counter-
intelligence cases having overlapping intelligence and criminal investi-
gations or interests, guiding them to prosecution."' 48  That is, the
court concluded that the Attorney General's interpretations of FISA
and the Patriot Act fundamentally contradicted the spirit of FISA by
allowing prosecutors to circumvent constitutional safeguards with re-
spect to foreign intelligence information-an interpretation encom-
passing a broad category of potential criminal activity.'49
The three-judge FISA court of review had never heard a gov-
ernment appeal in the Act's twenty-five year history. 5' However, in
this case, the Attorney General appealed, and the court of review re-
versed.' In fact, the court of review suggested that the lower FISA
court had exceeded its Article III power by purporting to "govern the
internal organization and investigative procedures of the Department
of Justice which are the province of the Executive Branch (Article II)
and the Congress (Article 1).''" By reversing the lower court's order,
the court of review granted the executive branch explicit authority to
employ otherwise unconstitutional law enforcement procedures while
145. In Re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp.
2d at 615.
It is selfq-]evident that the technical and surreptitious means available for acquisition
of information by electronic surveillances and physical searches, coupled with the
scope and duration of such intrusions and other practices under the FISA, give the




147. Id. In fact, at the time of the Patriot Act, the executive branch was internally investi-
gating these ethical abuses and misconduct. Id.
148. Id.
149. See supra note 141 (defining foreign intelligence information).
150. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 731.
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investigating broad classes of potential criminal activity, 153 which shall
be defined over time by means of ex parte government applications.
2. The Relevance of Russian Juridical History to These Cases and
This Analytical Framework
Russia's juridical history, as a foundation for critical analysis,
teaches that it is paramount to monitor the continua outlined and il-
lustrated above. In Russia, despite Tsar Alexander II's celebrated
1864 Reforms, political crimes were removed from the jurisdiction of
the jury."5 4 As the Russian state sought to protect itself from domestic
terrorist threats, the continua of political crimes and law enforcement
and judicial procedures expanded. That is, new law enforcement and
judicial procedures were developed to confront this threat. For exam-
ple, the Law of August 14, 1881, enacted soon after the acquittal of
Vera Zasulich and the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, authorized
local executive authorities to unilaterally invoke such procedures. 5
These procedures included relaxed search-and-seizure standards,
nonpublic criminal trials, military courts-martial for Russian citizens,
and the application of war-time laws.5 6 Further, the right to counsel
varied based on whether one was charged under the standard criminal
code or military law.'57 The Russian continua reached its greatest ex-
treme over a seven-month period in 1906 and 1907, when Russia exe-
cuted one thousand individuals." 8 As the threat grew, the fulcrum
balancing the rights of individuals and the interests of the state con-
tinued to shift. Despite these procedures, violent revolution soon fol-
lowed. Subsequently, the Soviet era was marked by a staunchly in-
quisitorial criminal justice system and a system of "nodders" and
"telephone justice."'5 9
Therefore, in the context of terror trials and ongoing strategies to
combat terrorism, we must continue to debate the delineation and
movement of specific cases, law enforcement, and judicial procedures
along these continua. We should ask questions regarding how federal
and state executive authorities define the political nature of crimes,
how judicial review of those decisions will be conducted, and what are
the procedural and constitutional implications of those decisions. In
addition, we should ask whether the government may unilaterally
153. See supra note 141 (defining FISA scope).
154. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
157. See KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 232.
158. Id. at 206.
159. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
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make such designations at any time in the criminal justice process.
Furthermore, the Patriot Act's extension of FISA to the realm of do-
mestic law enforcement activities raises important questions regarding
the encroachment of procedures designed to combat foreign threats to
national security upon the constitutional rights of American citizens.
For example, do district courts have a constitutional obligation to ex-
clude FISA-gathered evidence from domestic criminal prosecutions? 6 '
Thus far in the war on terrorism, the executive and legislative
branches of government have largely placed the burden of answering
these questions on the judiciary.' 6'
In an era of increasingly threatened state interests, Russian his-
tory teaches that a vigilant debate with respect to these continua is
necessary to preserve confidence in both law enforcement and in judi-
cial institutions themselves. Historian Samuel Kucherov reflected on
Tsar Alexander II's 1864 Reforms and the exclusion of political
crimes from the jury, which the state did not trust the people to adju-
dicate fairly:
[I]t is impossible to deprive the accused of this guarantee in
cases of crimes against the state without committing an injustice.
The guarantee provided by trial with jury has an especially great
importance precisely in cases of criminal offenses against the
state, because in these cases the state, which prosecutes the
crime, is at the same time the legal entity offended or harmed by
the crime. That is why no matter how impartial or independent
the judges appointed by the state may be, their decision in cases
of offenses against the state will never enjoy the confidence of
society. 62
Approximately fifteen years after those reforms, the state chose
to try Vera Zasulich before a jury for attempted murder. 63 Ms. Zasu-
lich's acquittal represented the public's resentment of both a criminal
justice system that excluded political criminals and detainees from
public review and an autocratic regime's relentless eradication of po-
160. See 147 CONG. REC. S10,591; S10,593; S10,992; S11,004; and S11,021 (daily ed. Oct.
25, 2001) (statements of various Senate Judiciary Committee Members). "In the American sys-
tem, the national legislature is primarily responsible for determining what the law should be. If,
through inaction, it effectively cedes that power to the [Plresident, the new rules will reflect the
presidency's interests at the expense of all others." The Stakes for Liberty, WASH. POST, Dec.
31, 2002, at A16.
161. In a historically autocratic state such as Russia, the concept of checks and balances
between various branches of government-specifically intended to limit the power of the other-
is foreign. Diehm, supra note 4, at, 27-28 (2001).
162. KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 64.
163. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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litical dissent.1 64  Tsar Alexander II's assassination led to additional
law enforcement and judicial procedures to combat political crimes:
relaxed search and seizure standards, nonpublic trials, military courts-
martial, and the application of war-time laws to citizens.16 In 1907,
V.A. Makalov, one of Russia's greatest trial lawyers, argued that
[w]here there is no law equally applicable to everybody, where
there are three laws, there is no legality at all. . . . There are two
pillars of the state: the law as a general rule, obligatory for all,
and the court as the defender of the law. When these pillars-
law and court-are intact, the state itself stays firm. 166
Today, Russia can proclaim its revival of trial by jury and the resur-
rection of judicial institutions to elevate the rights of individuals over
the interests of the state.
A government may test its citizens' confidence in law enforce-
ment and judicial procedures by granting disparate rights, rules, and
procedures to individuals depending on how the government chooses
to define criminal offenses. Therefore, citizens must carefully ques-
tion how their government makes these decisions and whether those
questions are subject to judicial review. These questions, for which
history provides ample fodder for reflection, are no less important in
times of war and national crisis. In actuality, these questions are es-
sential to protecting the constitutional balance between the rights of
individuals and the interests of the state, regardless of the political
climate in which they are raised. 6
164. See Butler, supra note 32, at 23; KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 222.
165. See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
166. KUCHEROV, supra, note 3, at 208-09.
167. It is essential to note that the rights of the individual and the interests of the state are
not mutually exclusive. For example, the United States prosecuted Ahmed Ressamn in my court-
room in 2000-01. Ressam tried to enter Washington State from Canada with a load of explo-
sives destined for the Los Angeles International Airport. Ressam, a foreign citizen and member
of a terrorist cell tied to Osama bin Laden, was tried before a jury and afforded full constitutional
protections. On April 6, 2001, the jury unanimously convicted him on nine counts that were
brought under the United States Criminal Code. See United States v. Ressam, No. CR99-666C,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25594 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 6, 2001). Following the trial, Ressam has pro-
vided assistance to the United States and to foreign governments with respect to the details of
terrorist cells, training camps, networks, and practices. Although his crime was highly political
and he was a foreign terrorist, protecting Ressam's individual rights did not, in the end, threaten
the interests of the state. In fact, the judicial process operated effectively to further those inter-
ests.
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B. Reconsidering the Role of Jury Nullification Under Our Federal
Sentencing Regime
A jury has the power to nullify the law. The jury may disregard
the law and rule according to its collective conscience by acquitting a
defendant despite the absence of doubt that the defendant committed
the crimes charged. However, our criminal justice system tradition-
ally allows the jury to realize this inherent power only through its own
deliberations. That is, the court does not instruct the jury as to its
nullification power, and lawyers may not cite that power in argu-
ment.168  In contrast, the Russian jury system actively educates the
jury with respect to its nullification power by means of a special ver-
dict form that explicitly distinguishes between perpetration and
guilt. 169 Moreover, the Russian judge summarizes the range of penal-
ties applicable to each crime charged before dismissing the jury for de-
liberations. 7 ° By way of these procedures, the jury remains ever-
cognizant of its ability to decide a case according to its conscience.
I do not advocate the Russian jury nullification system. Nor do I
embrace the various state and national jury nullification movements,
which seek to legislate rules mandating an instruction regarding (or
defense counsel's ability to argue) the jury's power to nullify the law in
every case.'7 ' However, I believe a trial court judge should have dis-
cretion, in rare and exceptional circumstances, to provide the jury lim-
ited instructions to educate it with respect to factors relevant to its
power to nullify the law. The rare cases to which I refer are those
where the mandatory minimum penalty under our federal sentencing
regime is grossly disproportionate to the alleged criminal acts."'
The notion that neither the parties nor the judge may instruct the
jury as to the sentence for a crime is premised on the rule that the jury
decides the facts and the judge decides the law and sentence.' For
example, Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 7.4 reads:
"The punishment provided by law for this crime is for the court to de-
cide. You may not consider punishment in deciding whether the gov-
ernment has proved its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable
168. See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573 (1994).
169. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Molly McDonough, Ballot Initiatives Shot Down, 1 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 43
(Nov. 8, 2002), at http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/n8elect.html.
172. For example, I recently contemplated instructing the jury with respect to a ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence in a case charging conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine. The ten-year sentence was grossly disproportionate to defendant's alleged
role in the case: providing a ride to an acquaintance who intended to purchase a small quantity of
drugs.
173. See, e.g., KUCHEROV, supra note 3, at 201.
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doubt." '174 However, Congress began to circumscribe district judges'
authority and discretion to tailor an appropriate sentence based on the
facts and circumstances of each particular case when it passed the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984.17 Through this Act, Congress created a
Sentencing Commission to "prescribe guideline ranges that specify an
appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons determined by
coordinating the offense behavior categories with the offender charac-
teristic categories." '176 For example, "An offense behavior category
might consist, for example, of 'bank robbery/committed with a
gun/$2500 taken.' An offender characteristic category might be 'of-
fender with one prior conviction not resulting in imprisonment. '-177
This transfer of authority and discretion away from the judge to a
faceless sentencing grid-subject to unreviewable manipulation by the
prosecutor's charging decisions-is a fundamental reason for educat-
ing the jury, in exceptional cases, with respect to mandatory minimum
sentences. In such cases, the jury effectively decides the punishment
through the act of conviction.
As discussed in detail below, jury nullification-allowing the
public to correct unjust laws-has historically played a vital role in our
criminal justice system. Similarly, Russia's past and present jury sys-
tems provide empirical support for limited instructions regarding
mandatory sentences in exceptional cases. Even in initial debates over
Tsar Alexander II's 1864 Reforms, the government recognized the
importance of allowing the public to democratically correct law, pol-
icy, and penalties that offend popular morality and value systems. 178
This was particularly true given the otherwise autocratic nature of the
Russian government.179 Jury nullification became prominent in Rus-
sia in the nineteenth century because Tsar Alexander I's 1864 Re-
forms failed to address Russia's Draconian mandatory sentencing
provisions. 8 ° Despite the infamous acquittal of Vera Zasulich in 1878
174. NINTH CIR. MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTION 7.4 (2002).
175. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998. The fundamental goal of the sentencing guidelines is to man-
date, in a sort of mathematical fashion, specific ranges of sentences based on specific offense
characteristics and specific offender characteristics. This system inherently erodes the discretion
of the district court judge to make his or her own determination as to an appropriate sentence for
the specific individual.
176. Id.
177. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (2002).
178. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
180. For example, because criminal penalties varied so vastly on bright-line factors, such as
a monetary sum stolen, the jury might make unsupported findings of fact to ensure a lesser sen-
tence. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (despite undisputed evidence to the contrary,
jury makes factual finding of 300 ruble theft because penalty for 500 ruble theft deemed too se-
vere).
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that might have led to a rejection of jury nullification, the Russian ju-
rists and legislators who crafted the Jury Law of 1993 recognized the
important role of jury nullification and integrated it into the revived
jury system.
Furthermore, statistics suggest that despite the procedures dis-
cussed above, Russian acquittal rates, both past and present, are not
artificially high. In the nineteenth century, studies revealed an acquit-
tal rate fluctuating between fifteen and twenty percent. 181 Similarly, in
the mid to late 1990s, Russia's acquittal rate varied between fourteen
and twenty-two percent. 82 American juries, in both state and federal
court, acquit criminal defendants at a rate in precisely the same range
as their Russian counterparts. 183 This is particularly interesting given
Russia's long history, as contrasted to that of the United States, of
autocratic rule and public resentment toward state power. Accord-
ingly, instructing the jury with respect to mandatory sentencing provi-
sions in exceptional cases would not be likely to artificially inflate the
overall acquittal rate.'84
In sum, the jury holds inherent power to nullify unjust laws, re-
gardless of whether the court informs it of its ability to do so. Both
Russia's and our own 8' juridical history reflects the vital role of this
power. Today, in exceptional cases, district judges should have
discretion to instruct the jury with respect to mandatory minimum
sentences under our federal sentencing regimes. Knowledge of
mandatory punishment may be essential to a jury's informed decision
of guilt or innocence. I share these sentiments with the late Honorable
William L. Dwyer. United States District Judge Dwyer, an ardent
champion of the jury system throughout his career, possessed both a
181. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. However, it is important to note again that
because Russia has no plea-bargaining system, all cases proceed to trial. Therefore, Russia's ac-
quittal rate may, in fact, be significantly higher than that in the United States because such a
small percentage of cases in the United States proceed to trial.
184. Although a thorough discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, con-
sider what role jury nullification may have today in the context of mandatory sentencing guide-
lines and the economy of punishment. Based on my twenty years of experience on the bench, I
believe that our federal prison populations are fueled by drug addiction. Incarceration rarely
cures this disease, which plays a prominent role in recidivism and demands, under our federal
sentencing regime, progressively longer periods of incarceration. In essence, as a result of these
mandatory sentencing provisions, we devote millions of dollars annually to incarcerate an addic-
tion without curing it. This creates an inefficient economy of punishment, ill-suited to the
criminal population, and an ineffective exercise of state power, expending scarce state resources.
See FOUCAULT, supra note 18, at 989-90 (discussing theory of economy of punishment and pull
between principles of codification and individualization).
185. See infra note 186 and accompanying text; Tr. of Trial, Vol. III at 2-6, United States
v. Martin, No. 98-278 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 1999); see also WILLIAM DWYER, IN THE HANDS
OF THE PEOPLE (Thomas Dunne Books, Saint Martin's Press 2002) (2000).
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pion of the jury system throughout his career, possessed both a judge's
and an historian's perspective on the role of jury nullification. What
follows is the transcript of a ruling by Judge Dwyer that discusses the
role of jury nullification in our judicial tradition and summarizes its
relevance under our current federal sentencing regime. I concur fully
in the opinion, which is far more eloquent than any I could now offer:
I can give you a ruling now on this. Defense counsel has asked
for leave to argue the mandatory minimum sentence to the jury.
I have decided to cover that subject in an instruction which will
form part of the instructions given to the jury tomorrow. I've
done this for two reasons.
The first is that the jury has heard evidence about the manda-
tory minimums. This was brought out without objection during
the cross-examination of Ms. Gilbert. Ms. Gilbert is a critically
important witness in this case. The jury's assessment of her
credibility may be affected by knowledge of the mandatory
minimum sentence she would face if she did not cooperate by
engaging in drug transactions with Mr. Martin and then testify-
ing against him.
That subject will be left in a foggy and uncertain state if the jury
hears nothing about it except the testimony of Ms. Gilbert, who
is not only a lay witness but one whose credibility is questioned
to start with. Therefore, it is appropriate to tell the jury by way
of an instruction exactly what the situation is under the manda-
tory sentencing laws.
The second basis for the proposed instruction is the one argued
for by defense counsel in making the request. There is no doubt
that the jury in any criminal case has the right to acquit on the
basis of higher justice; in other words, on the basis of conscience.
Jury nullification, as it is sometimes called, is a fundamental
principle of our system. The founders expected it to continue in
full force and effect when the Sixth Amendment was adopted,
and it has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court ever since.
It has, in some ways, a distinguished history. One episode oc-
curred in the colonial period when the thirteen colonies were
protesting and resisting unjust taxing and tariff laws imposed by
Great Britain. A famous period of jury nullification came dur-
ing the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law in the middle of
the nineteenth century. Other examples came during the Viet-
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nam War in which, in some of the prosecutions of protestors,
jury nullification again appeared.
And it has quite a history also in connection with excessive sen-
tencing laws, or at least laws that the community at large and ju-
ries have deemed to be unduly cruel and extraordinary and be-
yond any legitimate expectations.
That, in fact, is one way-oddly enough-in which the jury
gained its measure of strength and independence to start with,
by nullifying in many capital cases. Particularly in England,
when there were a couple of hundred different capital offenses
on the books,'86 the jury gained a measure of strength and inde-
pendence it might not otherwise have achieved.
It's a fundamental duty of the courts to protect this part of our
constitutional heritage. And to do that, the judge in rare cases-
certainly not as a matter of routine, but in rare cases-should re-
lax the rule of relevancy to permit matters to come before the
jury, even if they would not make out a legal defense. This was
done, for example, in some of the Vietnam war protestor cases in
which courts allowed defendants to testify to their motives and
purposes in protesting the war, even though these would not
constitute a defense to the specific charges.
I did it recently in a case where the defendant was charged with
violating an asbestos control statute. He was allowed to testify
that he thought what he was doing was legal, even though that
would not have made out a defense. The defendant, by the way,
was nevertheless convicted.
The precise question here is whether the jury should be told of
an extraordinarily harsh mandatory minimum sentencing law.
There is an eloquent district court decision that supports this.
That is United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411 (M.D. Tenn.
1993). And the proposition is also well supported by a lengthy,
thorough and scholarly article found at 95 COLUMBIA L. REV.
1232 (1995).
Of course, there are cases that have come out the other way in
various district courts. But a number of judges, including
judges in this circuit--district judges-have taken a course simi-
lar to the one I'm taking today in letting the jury know that cer-
tain mandatory minimum penalties would apply.
186. FOUCAULT, supra note 18, at 36-38 (Blackstone reference).
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There is no Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court authority that pro-
hibits this being done. The United States Attorney has cited
Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 24 (1994), [sic] which does
indeed contain some broad language about sentencing not being
the business of the jury and about the usual practice being that
juries are not told what the sentencing consequences of a guilty
verdict will be.
No one quarrels with those general propositions. But the Shan-
non case is really not on point, because it does not concern any
claim of a right to present information to the jury necessary to
possible jury nullification or to prevent government oppression,
which is, of course, the main legal and jurisprudential underpin-
ning of jury nullification. What it did concern was a request
that an instruction be given to avoid possible juror confusion.
So Shannon is not truly on point.
And as I say, there is no authority from a higher court that
would prohibit the imparting of the information that I propose
to impart in this instruction-which does include a statement,
by the way, that sentencing is a matter for the court and not for
the jury. And indeed, it would be surprising if any appellate
court tried to prohibit trial judges from making discretionary
rulings that relax the relevancy standard so as to allow the jury
to have information that is clearly important to the legitimate
function of jury nullification.
Anyone interested in this subject and in the jury's role generally
would do well to read a recent scholarly book by Professor Jef-
frey Abramson entitled We, the Jury.
Sometimes a formula is expressed that the jury finds the facts,
and that's all. In other words, that the jury then just mechani-
cally applies the law given to it. All trial lawyers know and all
trial judges know that that falls far short of describing the full
reality of what the jury does. And it certainly falls far short, in-
deed, of describing what juries have historically meant and were
intended to mean and still mean and should mean in our system.
In this case it is important that the jury know about the manda-
tory minimum, subject to these qualifications: The jury will also
need to be advised of the defendant's opportunity to avoid the
mandatory minimum, either before or after sentencing, on the
basis of cooperation resulting in a motion by the United States
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Attorney. There will be no instruction given on jury nullifica-
tion, and counsel may not argue jury nullification to the jury.'
8 7
III. CONCLUSION
Today, the questions I receive from Russian jurists do not bear
the same reverence toward our judicial system that they once did. As
they struggle against Russia's autocratic past to revive the jury system
and implement other democratic criminal justice reforms, they wonder
whether our criminal justice system reflects an opposite trend. They
question whether an over-empowered executive branch may injure the
state it purports to protect and whether our independent judiciary can
withstand its authority. I sense that my Russian peers hope our his-
tory does not come to mirror their own. We cannot be blind to the re-
flections Russia's history casts. The jury system, regardless of the so-
ciety in which it operates, fundamentally represents an elevation of the
rights of individuals over the interests of the state. With respect to
this principle, Russia provides a foundation for historically grounded
consideration of the challenges we face today. As Russia aspires to
replicate the criminal justice institutions and respect for individual
rights we have modeled for generations, Russia may be our con-
science, providing both context and caution. Russia's history should
help us ask those questions that are difficult to ask: How do we prop-
erly balance constitutional rights and national security in the war on
terrorism? Do we risk elevating the interests of the state over the
rights of individuals by employing alternative law enforcement and
judicial procedures to combat threats to national security? Over time,
will those procedures, which vary markedly according to a crime's
definition, swallow more traditional procedures as definitions blur?
Do we risk crippling the democratic force of the jury by unduly dis-
187. Tr. of Trial, Vol. III at 2-6, United States v. Martin, No. 98-278 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
25, 1999). Judge Dwyer then proposed the following jury instruction:
During the testimony of Ms. Gilbert, you have heard evidence regarding what the
federal sentencing laws require in cases of this nature. Sentencing is a matter for the
court, not for the jury. A federal statute requires that a person convicted of crimes of
distributing cocaine, or possessing it, with intent to distribute, be sentenced to at least
ten years imprisonment if the amount involved was five kilograms of powder cocaine
or fifty grams of cocaine base. If the person has a prior conviction for a felony drug
offense, the mandatory minimum term is twenty years imprisonment. These manda-
tory minimums can be avoided if the person cooperates with the government in the
investigation or prosecution of another person, and the prosecutor files a motion seek-
ing a lower sentence. This may be done before the sentence is imposed, or within one
year afterward. Without such a motion being made by the prosecutor, the Court or-
dinarily has no ability to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence.
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couraging its power to correct unjust laws? Most importantly, as a re-
sult, do we risk eroding public confidence in the institutions and prin-
ciples we trumpet and treasure? Only history will truly provide the
answers to these questions. However, history can only do so if we
have the courage to ask.
